Introduction
The spaces of housing and home express and shape practically every facet of human life. They are the centre-piece of a geography of connectedness, variously anchoring and energising the myriad threads of economy, environment, culture and society that infuse the domestic sphere. This pivotal role for housing merits closer questioning from all disciplines: what forces are required to assemble the meanings and materials of dwelling; what flows of funds, things, people and services hold homes together, or indeed pull them apart (Jacobs, 2006) ; what values are invested in, and wrested from, the social and material structures of residential space?
My contribution is concerned with the specifically financial flows embroiled in the construction, meaning, use and exchange of residential property. A broad aim is to bridge the divide between work on 'home cultures', which rarely tackles the hard edge of finance, and themes in housing economics which underplay the wider meanings of dwelling (building on . To that end, I focus on owner occupation À an arena juxtaposing the juggling of domestic life in the 'ordinary economy' (Lee, 2006) with the globalisation of finance and its attendant renegotiation of social contracts.
My examples are drawn from jurisdictions typified by, but not restricted to, the English-speaking world, where housing systems are anchored on owner occupation and financed by mortgage debt. There are countries whose rates of ownership are higher but whose indebtedness is less, notably in Eastern Europe. There are also housing systems characterised by lower rates of home ownership but very high ratios of mortgage debt to GDP, such as Denmark and the Netherlands. This variability À a geography of residential capitalism À is elaborated by Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008) . While it may seem parochial amid such variety to focus on jurisdictions whose housing systems are both mortgage-backed and ownership-centred, there are two good reasons to do so.
First, despite some reduction (around 5% in the USA, UK and Australia) in the proportion of homes in owner occupation in the wake of a 'global housing crisis' (Aalbers, 2015) owner occupation remains buoyant across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Andrews & Sanchez, 2011) . To be sure, there has been a reshaping of housing opportunities in the post-crisis world, and tenure transitions, especially for the young, are undoubtedly part of this (Kennett, Forrest, & Marsh, 2013) . However, the nudge to 'business as usual' in a tenure-divided housing world is relentless (Smith, 2010) .
Second, mortgaged owner occupation is the social, as well as political and economic norm; it remains the preferred housing outcome of the responsible, riskaverse citizen. In that guise, it is infused with existential qualities (like safety and security) which comfortably co-exist, in the same space, place and time, as their demonstrably precarious opposites. The motivation for this paper is that contradictions like this, which are inherent within owner occupation, are so readily takenfor-granted that there is no serious search for alternatives.
My aim, therefore, is to question a status quo around housing policy and practice which valorises tenure-divided societies by juxtaposing a mainstream ownership ideal with its marginalised 'Other', renting. Detractors exist, of course, but they look mainly to increase the rented sector, rather than to break the dualism apart. Even the research community is inclined to argue for or against, rather than 'instead of' leveraged home ownership. To change the terms of this debate, I attempt, in the sections that follow, to create space in the intellectual, political and practical imagination to envisage a future for housing that is neither anchored on nor defined in relation to the present orthodoxy.
To that end, to address the absurdities of the status quo, I offer four short thought experiments designed to question the character and tenacity of leveraged home ownership. Taking housing assets and mortgage debts in turn, I identify for each a spatial and a financial paradox that allows people to be and to feel, not just at home but positively sheltered, in the uncomfortable hybrid of money, meanings and materials which constitutes owner occupation today. As well as casting light on why this miscellany sometimes holds together, and what its limits are, I attempt, by way of conclusion, to consider whether the uncanny character of owner occupation might ever be resolved.
To illustrate, I draw lightly on a variety of secondary resources. Qualitative studies are an essential route into the meanings of homes and the behaviours of home occupiers in heavily financialised housing regimes. To embrace that I profile some findings from the ESRC-funded study 'Banking on Housing; Spending the Home' (BoH) À a project I completed with Nicole Cook and Beverley Searle during the most recent housing cycle (Smith, Searle, & Cook, 2007) . However, quantitative, population-wide trends are also important, and for these I draw from my collaboration with Rachel Ong, Sharon Parkinson, Beverley Searle and Gavin Wood using two nationally representative panel surveys À the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the survey of Housing Income and Labour Dynamics of Australia (HILDA).
Home values Spatial paradox: an 'ethopolitical' hybrid
At its simplest, a paradox may be thought of as 'a self-contradictory statement that nevertheless seems true'. To say that 'a stream of locationally fixed services purchased to meet basic needs, an object of consumption bought for enjoyment and use, and a space that adds meaning to life, will, in its lumpiness and indivisibility, also deliver reasonable and reliable financial returns', is intuitively self-contradictory. However, owner occupation is de facto such a paradox, and uniquely so.
Anyone can invest in the fortunes of a range of market-provisioned services or commodities by buying shares, or instruments linked to funds, or via more complex trading arrangements. However, these acts are quite removed from paying for goods and services supplied to specific individuals in particular places at given times. The former are acts of investment, made with a view to financial return; the latter are matters of consumption, during which a discrete service is received for a fixed price, and products, such as cars, clothes or washing machines, are destroyed through use, until no exchange value remains.
Paradoxically, in the guise of owner occupation À the most acceptable and sought-after style of accommodation in the western world À these acts of investment, service procurement and consumption are rolled inextricably together. It is not possible to buy the location, the fabric, the services or the domestic spaces, of a home, without also purchasing the substantial investment vehicle attached to this m elange. These constituents are neither divisible nor (in most jurisdictions) separately priced; as far as the fusing of functions packaged into residential property is concerned, it is 'all or nothing'.
This hybrid form has bewitched economists for years, in that they have accepted and interrogated it without producing much challenge to the status quo. On the other hand, most agree that this style of home occupation does not endure by appeal to economic rationality, much less ontological necessity. Its ideological trappings are clear (Ronald, 2008) . Therefore, why do politicians, policy-makers and the publics they serve continue to buy into this self-evidently awkward tenure type?
One answer is rooted in the normalisation of owner occupation À a process traced out in Gurney's (1999) seminal paper, and perhaps best developed by Flint (2003) who draws from Foucault to make sense of the mix of financial incentives, legal arrangements, material practices and vocabularies of motivation implicated in the success of the ownership ideal. Such scholarship positions the rise of 'residential capitalism' as both an economic and a political project, and recognises that the latter is effected through acts of governance À material and symbolic À which prescribe owner occupation as part of the art of responsible citizenship and ethical living. From this perspective, the normalisation of owner occupation is an ethopolitical achievement.
I use this section to elaborate on the normalisation thesis, as it tests the limits of the spatial paradox that underpins it. To frame the discussion, I draw from the Banking on Housing study, completed at the zenith of the last housing cycle and marking the culmination of a series of UK qualitative studies which, in the run up to the GFC, asked a cross section of home occupiers why they chose to buy. Replies from 150 semi-structured telephone conversations in BoH are summarised in Table 1 ; those from previous studies are collated in Smith (2008) . Although these data are peculiar to the UK and specific to the last housing cycle, they are worth profiling because they resonate with other findings within and beyond north-west Europe (Colic-Peisker, Johnson, & Smith, 2010; Doling & Elsinga, 2006; Mandic, 2010) , and reflect continuities that may be pertinent to recent market recoveries. Table 1 captures the views of longstanding and more recent home buyers, who are mortgagors and therefore of working age. Their comments engage with one or more of five dominant themes; these form the rows of the table. The first two rows simply confirm the extent to which inhabiting the functional and financial hybrid known as owner occupation persists unquestioned as a cultural norm. Just as it forms a centrepiece of the American and Australian 'dream', home ownership is cast in row 1 as a 'traditionally British thing to do' À an ideological imperative that is passed between generations. The comments in row 2 confirm further that embracing this tradition adds to self-worth, forming a flip side to the opprobrium infusing renting, in an ethopolitical mix that still valorises tenure-divided housing landscapes.
The remaining rows (3À5) of Table 1 are more salient for the present discussion. The sheer variety of views indicates that 'normalisation' is not about forging consensus around a single, enduring set of ideas. The comments suggest rather that there is a flexible repertoire of qualities that might be imposed or invoked. I would expect the specific mix of themes to vary geographically, but equally it might adjust over time to people's changing expectations of owner occupation. It is this latter possibility that most intrigues me. Placing the comments in rows 3À5 in this light, they can be read as representing the layers of financial promise successively attached to the spaces of owned homes by shifts in the wider political economy. These layers refer to the savings, investment and insurance function that every unique, locationally fixed, owner-occupied dwelling unit is now expected to supply. I consider them in turn.
In a housing system like England's, which shifted from majority (90%) rent to majority (70%) own in less than a century, it is unsurprising that most owner occupiers compare themselves favourably in almost every respect to their 'Other', the renter (row 3). However, notwithstanding the cultural distancing this implies, as the quotations indicate, financial comparisons between these tenure types are more insistent. The merits of owner occupation as a method of 'enforced savings' are especially notable À a theme dating back to the 1930s when the first sustained increase in mortgaged owner occupation was sold to the working classes as the 'thinking persons' alternative to squandering incomes on rents (Scott, 2004) . This triggered the emergence (and sustained the appetite) of the British suburban housing consumer, in search of their 'ideal home'. For parallels in the USA, see Harris (2009) .
The consumer figure persists, as does the vision of owner occupation as a device to spread incomes across the life course. It is telling, however, that nearly two-thirds of BoH participants spent less time comparing themselves with renters, and rather more, as row 4 indicates, referring to the merits of owner occupation as a source of investment returns. I have written before about the late-twentieth-century emergence of an 'investor figure' in housing À someone too responsible to gamble, too sensible to speculate, but wise enough to invest in property (Smith, 2008) . Here I simply note that, while adding strain to the spatial paradox (demanding an investment premium as well as a savings function from the spaces of housing and home), even at the zenith of the last housing cycle, this figure did not appear driven by the irrational exuberance that some suggest inflated the housing bubble. Perhaps they were less restrained then than they would be now, but most spoke of modest expectations from a 'reasonable' investment, with, to my reading, no sense of frenzy. This is in line with other UK findings (Munro & Smith, 2008) . In fact, far from seeking quick profits, the BoH housing investor is attracted by durability: she/he is a riskaverse wealth-seeker, immersed in an ethic of ownership, in search of stability and rootedness. This is underlined in the last row of Table 1 , which captures the close coupling between expected investment returns and a sense of security, for oneself and for family, especially children. Security is a complex matter, and conversations drift readily from tenure to finance and back. However, it is striking that BoH participants were twice as likely to have bought into ownership to underpin their children's security as to meet their own needs in older age. While most subscribe to a traditional bequest model, others anticipate using homes actively as a financial tool, for their children's 'education, or their marriage or whatever they want to do'. A recent round of ethnographic interviews with home buyers in Denmark also shows a deep interconnection between housing assets and 'a sense of social obligation and values related to kin in general and children in particular, and to the importance of safety' (Sjørslev, 2012, p. 17) .
While 'security' is no stranger to the literature on owner occupation, the explicit positioning of housing wealth as a wide-ranging safety net for uncertain times is a more recent trend. In the transcripts underpinning Table 1 , for example, housing wealth is often labelled with descriptors À like 'safety net' À once reserved for the institutions of the welfare state . Other studies within and beyond the UK similarly indicate the extent to which, by the early twenty-first century, owned homes had acquired an insurance, as well as investment function (see Doling & Ronald, 2010a; Lowe, 2011; Lowe, Searle, & Smith, 2011 ; and the chapters in Smith & Searle, 2010, Part 2) . In short, as a variety of once-universal social safety nets have thinned out, geographically fixed, unevenly accumulating, private housing assets have moved in. This is consistent with Watson's (2010) account of the consolidation, in the early twenty-first century, of what he calls 'house price Keynesianism' À the emergence of a new politicalÀeconomic orthodoxy linking a reconstructed 'model homeowner' (who buys into owner occupation to secure an asset base for welfare) with the new 'model welfare recipient' (who, having contributed conscientiously to the growth of an asset-holding society, can look forward to benefitting individually from it). By the dawn of the new millennium, housing markets had become the ideal site for household asset accumulation, and the twenty-first-century owner occupier had learned to regard their home as a hard-won buffer against life's ills. Watson shows further that housing asset-holders, like the investor figures preceding them, were encouraged in their beliefs and behaviours by a combination of moral directives, fiscal incentives and direct political interventions, and the effect was to overlay an already-entrenched owner/tenant dualism with an opposition between active and passive welfare recipience.
The contribution of owner-occupied housing to a shift away from collective-to self-provisioning was anticipated a quarter century ago (Saunders, 1990) . However, this expectation has been eclipsed by a process of 'welfare switching' whereby an accumulation of individualised housing assets has legitimised, perhaps incentivised, the retreat of social insurance. Historically, there has been much talk among scholars about the ontological security that goes with a place, a room or a home of one's own (Dupuis & Thorns, 1998; Hiscock, Macintyre, Kearns, & Ellaway, 2003) . Today, a more critical analytical focus is the sense of financial and social security that flows from having, or aiming for, a home that one owns.
The spatial paradox is pushed to its limit. In post-welfare states, locationally fixed housing services must deliver sufficient investment returns to underwrite households' wider well-being, and insure a range of risks. Whether, when, where and for whom this works is a moot point. That so many individuals, including policy-makers and politicians, think or hope that it does À that the veracity of the claim seems self-evident À betrays the tenacity of a related, financial, contradiction.
Financial paradox: politics versus rationality
A second way of describing a paradox is when something appears self-evident yet cannot be true. The financial paradox around housing assets is of this type. As noted above, by the dawn of the twenty-first century, home buyers had come to regard housing investments as a wise use of money and home assets as a source of security. Contributing to, and flowing from, this presumption is an uncanny concentration of wealth into property. By 2001 in the USA, nearly two-thirds of the net wealth of median households was held in single-family dwellings (Benjamin, Chinloy, & Jud, 2004) ; by the end of 2003, about half the personal wealth of the UK was likewise invested in owned homes (Cerny, Miles, & Schmidt, 2005) ; in Australia, today the figure is about 40% (Australian Bureau of statistics [ABS] , 2013) and in New Zealand, it is over 50% overall, rising to 80% for owner occupiers themselves (Scobie, Le, & Gibson, 2007) .
There is, of course, geographical variability in portfolio composition. Some inter-jurisdictional differences can be accounted for by economic and institutional differences (Banks, Blundell, Oldfield, & Smith, 2004) , and thanks to the house price gradient, urban wealth portfolios may be more housing-heavy than their rural counterparts (Kohler & Smith, 2005) . Price volatility in all assets (often uncorrelated) automatically varies portfolio composition over time, while price expectations affect housing and other investment decisions in different ways (Corradin, Fillat, & Vergara-Alert, 2013) . However, the inescapable fact is that, notwithstanding locational and temporal variabilities, housing is, overall, the single most important component of personal wealth in most countries (Muellbauer, 2007) . Owned homes are not just an asset base; they form the asset base for individuals, communities and, increasingly, entire jurisdictions. From an ethopolitical perspective, this sounds logical, but viewed economically, can it be wise?
From the perspective of professional financial management, it is certainly anomalous. Portfolio theories of investment recognise that the market is hard to beat and view diversification across asset classes as axiomatic, especially for the risk-averse. As owner occupiers generally are risk-averse (indeed, as the last section showed, they are security-seeking), it is puzzling from a financial perspective that they hold most of their wealth not just in a single-asset class, but in one unique, locationally fixed, property which is also their home.
Often, of course, it is not a matter of choice. Housing is a large, expensive asset whose indivisibility leaves most home buyers with few options but to hold the majority of their wealth in a single primary residence. In this context, there is an incentive to buy early and pay high (rather than diversify) as a hedge against price volatility (Banks et al., 2004) . The fact that housing is the only leveraged investment available to most people also helps explain why it is the one substantial asset (alongside pensions) that most households possess. Finally, in some settings, tax incentives are overwhelming: why diversify into investments whose returns are taxed (perhaps above the marginal rate) when the returns on owner occupation are not?
Perhaps these factors entirely account for the portfolio distortion that occurs in ownership-centred societies. Certainly, most economic analyses of wealth portfolio allocation have overlooked this anomaly, albeit on account of the presumed illiquidity of housing assets. With just a few exceptions, therefore (see Pelizzon & Weber, 2008 , for a round-up), they cast little light on the matter. Housing economics, on the other hand, which has sought to juxtapose housing with other forms of wealth, has been less concerned with portfolio efficiency than with differential wealth effects on consumption (Case, Quigley, & Shiller, 2012) . As a result, surprisingly little is known about the beliefs and behaviours driving the concentration of personal wealth into private property.
Qualitative studies suggest that there is, nevertheless, much to excavate. In the UK, for example, BoH study participants expressed a clear preference for housing over other assets: the majority (even those who could) did not consider buying less housing in order to hold funds elsewhere. When pressed, they expressed the view that housing assets are safe relative to other investments, legible in comparison with other financial instruments, and likely À in the long run À to produce the best overall return ). Housing assets also have a tangibility that cannot be lost in electronic space, and whose value can be augmented by 'sweat equity'.
These 'common sense' understandings of wealth portfolio trade-offs raise many new questions. Some can be explored quantitatively, for example, the impact on wealth portfolios of inertia, on the one hand (Brunnermeier & Nagel, 2008) , and of households' variable financial literacy on the other (Cardak & Wilkins, 2009 ). However, most require new stylised facts, and this project has so far attracted limited research. The exception is in the trade-off between housing asset accumulation and pensions, where a multi-disciplinary approach is emerging (Clark, 2012; Delfani, Deken, & Dewilde, 2014; Doling & Elsinga, 2013; Doling & Ronald, 2010b; Elsinga, Quilgars, & Doling, 2012) . Beyond this, only Schill's (2015) study of housing and the wealth portfolio aims for a systematic qualitative picture of the motivations and behaviours driving asset allocation in the domestic economy.
There remains the question of just how, in practice, holding so many financial eggs in the basket of a single owned home might work for individuals and whole societies. What do housing-centred wealth portfolios mean for spending and welfare needs in post-crisis jurisdictions? In what sense does an ethopolitics of ownership make ordinary economic sense?
Some take a positive view. In the long run, housing wealth À which is more widely distributed geographically and socio-economically than other wealth holdings À has arguably boosted the accumulation of net wealth among middle and lower income groups, who have few other resources (Boehm & Schlottmann, 2008; Di, Yang, & Liu,, 2003) . There is also debate rather than consensus as to whether the uneven geography of house price appreciation is, in the end, unequalising or redistributive (Bezrukova, 2013; Thomas & Dorling, 2004) .
What cannot be contested, however, is the fact that with housing as with all wealth-holdings, the rich have substantially more than the poor. Therefore, if housing is to form an asset base for welfare, there is an inherent mismatch between needs and resources, even before spatial variations in house price appreciation and cohort effects are added to the mix. Moreover, for any socio-economic group, only half can hold housing assets with above-average rates of return, and it is not clear, even then, whether and when housing will perform better than other investments.
Finally, house prices are volatile, and housing investment risks (almost uniquely) cannot currently be insured.
Therefore, in what sense and by what mechanisms can housing-heavy wealth portfolios meet the spending needs that post-Keynesian 'welfare switching' implies? After all, owner occupation must also function as a home, and the obvious routes to equity release À trading down and selling up À imply domestic upheaval. Moreover, physical housing assets can be illiquid (especially, for example, in recession, when they are most required), and they are always costly to cash in. What makes the financial paradox seem plausible? By way of an answer, I turn to the matter of mortgage debt.
Mortgage debt Spatial paradox: homes as (in)securities
As a third thought experiment, consider an object that can be described as both one thing and its opposite. This paradox aptly captures the character of owned homes when they are used as securities for loans À a process that de facto renders them insecure, and not only for their occupiers.
Assets like housing appeal to lenders for much the same reason they appeal to households: they are tangible, fixed and cannot be lost, stolen or transferred to another jurisdiction; furthermore, their occupier, the borrower, is easy to locate. To capitalise on the value of assets that are hard to hide and awkward to move, a special financial instrument has been invented: the mortgage, a line of credit secured against the title of a property. Anchored in this way on assets that are forfeit in the event of default, mortgages could be larger, cheaper and have a longer life than other styles of borrowing.
Mortgages thus turned housing into the only leveraged investment readily available to the public. For much of the twentieth century, mortgage markets and owner occupation expanded hand in hand, limited only by credit constraints. Towards the turn of the century, however, the nature of this relationship changed, and mortgage markets took on a life of their own (Smith, 2013) . A plethora of new products came onto the books in what many have seen as a pantomime of smoke and mirrors that tricked marginal borrowers into securing mortgages they could not afford on homes they were unable to keep. However, new loans for first-time buyers did not form the leading edge of borrowing at this time; neither did funds secured 'simply' for trading up. More important was the rise of equity borrowing (mortgage equity withdrawal), or 'cash out' refinance, as it is known in the USA (Ong, Parkinson, Searle, Smith, & Wood, 2013; Pennington-Cross & Chomsisengphet, 2007) . There is much to say about this, but two points are relevant here.
The first, illustrated here with reference to transcripts from 35 home visits completed with equity borrowers for the BoH study, is the extent to which mortgagors differentiate loans secured against homes from other lines of credit. Rather little has been written about the way households regard the different elements of their 'debt portfolio' À about the substitutability (or not) of loan types, or the qualitative (as well as cost) differences between personal, family and secured loans. To my reading, however, practically all the case study households in the Banking on Housing study drew a sharp line between mortgages and other debts. Notably, they tended not to see equity borrowing as adding to debts: 'I'm really, really, really not a borrower'.
'I don't think of mortgages as debt'
'it doesn't feel like borrowing' Rather, they regarded it as tapping into an asset created through their own efforts and skills: Second, the quantitative record suggests that just as equity borrowing has its roots in an asset close to home, so the expenditures it fuels work to hold domestic space together. When mortgage lending was closely regulated, additional loans were often restricted to funds formally earmarked for renovations, extensions and repairs. By the turn of the twenty-first century no such qualifications applied. Nevertheless, borrowers still connected mortgages with housing wealth, and used draw-down for reinvestment, continuing a tradition that fuelled the US house improvement industry (Harris 2009 ), underpinned Australia's 'renovation nation' (Allon, 2008) , and crafted Britain's 'changing rooms' society (Smith, 2008) .
What is intriguing for the UK is that, in the one longitudinal survey that measures it, over a period spanning more than 15 years (from 1990), equity borrowers' enthusiasm to reinvest into property appears to have waned (Smith & Searle, 2008; . Economists would, of course, expect owners to withhold reinvestment during recession (Leonard, 2013) , but this new trend persisted into the upswing of the housing cycle, so that as equity borrowing increased, reinvestment declined in favour of 'other' styles of expenditure.
To understand this behavioural twist, I return to the borrowers themselves. They talk of spending the fruits of equity borrowing on a smattering of holidays and shopping trips À the 'champagne moments' that the press are so fond of reporting À and some other complexities that cannot be drawn out here (see Cook, Smith, & Searle, 2013) . Generally, however, the indication is that when equity borrowings are not reinvested into property, they are spent equally close to home, often easing households' budgets by underwriting family needs in the wake of stagnant incomes and fiscal uncertainty. Here is a glimpse from the BoH transcripts:
'When I changed to a flexible mortgage, it was like getting out of an iron lung. . . I lived poor here until this came along.' 'We didn't have income coming in. . . it was a way of covering our backs' 'We saw the money as a way of helping us out of a bad time' 'It benefitted my family, which is important'
There are echoes of this in other jurisdictions. In Denmark, for example, Sjørslev (2012) found that '"cashing the equity". . . was best justified when the money was used for certain things such as children's education or the strengthening of family relationships' (p. 17). It seems that offsetting a drop in the tendency to reinvest in domestic materials is a rise in the use of equity borrowing to underwrite the quality and conduct of domestic life.
By exploiting the longitudinal character of BHPS and HILDA (matching equity borrowing episodes with socio-economic characteristics and life events), colleagues and I have identified some population-wide generalisations that support this. We looked at in situ equity borrowing À the practice of adding to mortgage debt without moving home, arguably motivated only by the need to raise funds for other things. This appears to be triggered by pressing uninsured or uninsurable spending needs associated with the presence of children, the costs of relationship breakdown and actual or anticipated financial worsening (Parkinson, Searle, Smith, Stoakes, & Wood, 2009; , see also Searle, 2011 . This suggests that it is equity borrowing, not asset liquidation, which achieves the welfare switching effect. Housing wealth may be positioned, in the political and public imagination, as an asset that can supplement, replace or even displace systems of social insurance. However, in practice, this effect has more usually been achieved by using owned homes to secure loans to assuage the insecurities of postwelfare states.
Not surprisingly, this kind of borrowing only works by setting up its own contradiction. It may be cheaper than trading down, more 'homely' than selling up, and entirely practical, given the indivisibility and illiquidity of housing assets, on the one hand, and the wave of credit engulfing the ordinary economy, on the other. However, whatever the short-term gains À and even these are questionable Cigdem, Ong, Smith, & Wood, 2014 ) À serial equity borrowing can be risky for individuals, as well as compromising civil society (Ross & Squires, 2011) , and destabilising the wider economy (Khandani, Lo, & Merton, 2013) . In short, when housing assets are positioned as securities for loans, they expose the insecurities inherent in mortgaged owner occupation. They are both one thing and its opposite. To explain how this coupling survived for so long, and to understand why and when it failed, I consider now a fourth and final (financial) paradox.
Financial paradox: a crisis of residential capitalism
My final window onto the paradoxical character of owner occupation is partly inspired by physics and astronomy À subjects centrally concerned to explain how an entire universe materialised out of nothing. It is tempting to see the unprecedented flow of finance into post-millennial housing markets as a 'something out of nothing' paradox of this kind. After all, in the space of two decades, systems constrained by a shortage of funds for lending were deluged by a tide of credit, which now had actively to be sold, rather than sparingly rationed. This inspired the equity-borrowing bonanza which, by turning housing into a spendable resource, appeared to deliver, from this asset base, both an investment premium and a welfare-switching effect. However, while equity borrowing, distinctively anchored in domestic assets, was spent locally or familiarly to hold homes together, the catalyst that drove it unleashed an opposing force. A round financial innovation designed to make all debts À indeed every financial thing À the same, linked local loans to global flows (Aalbers, 2012; Martin, 2010) , stripping out the assets that secured them and pulling households apart. The world of housing and home was drawn into a bigger, less hospitable project than its incumbents had in mind, in a manner which, by securing 'nothing' (the erosion of assets) out of 'something' (the possession of a title deed), in the end seems more aligned with conjuring than creation.
Either way, what held this final paradox together, initially at least, was the conviction that the financial deepening it implied was essentially a bid for inclusion. To meet demand in underserved areas, banks sold their loans to institutional investors, to raise new funds for lending. This might always have been questionable (Goetzmann and Spiegel, 2001 ), but such investors were awkwardly light on housing assets, and turned readily to the obvious proxy, mortgage debt (Smith, 2009 ). This fuelled the growth of mortgage-backed and mortgage-heavy bonds, which were soon created not only from loans provided via the USA's 'relatively safe' government-sponsored enterprises, but also from riskier mortgage products (Green & Wachter, 2010) . It was, therefore, the appetite of global investors, not the needs of local communities that turned a shortage of mortgage finance into a surplus of debt funding. What Gotham (2009) describes as the creation of liquidity from spatial fixity had acquired a life of its own, which is how people with 'no incomes, jobs or assets' were located as a source of exceptional returns for those hungry to invest into debt.
Creating something out of nothing may work for the universe, but as Mian and Sufi (2014) recognise, in the world of lending and borrowing it was always an illusion and would soon disappear. There are many explanations for this. Harvey (2010) mentions human frailty, institutional failure, false theory (the idea that financial innovation would create more complete, efficient, markets), cultural obsession (with owner occupation) and failure of policy (too little, or too much, or the wrong kind of, regulation). His own position is that the over-supply of credit is the latest contradiction of capitalism whose crises, he argues, relocate rather than resolve. In the wake of the dotcom bubble, with wages and incomes stagnating, only housing could anchor the debts required to drive consumption to fuel the economy. Every financial and political institution in the neoliberal world was geared to keeping this contradiction in place.
I have some sympathy with this analysis; it is more plausible and internally consistent than many other accounts. However, the early twenty-first century saw a crisis of residential capitalism, and this (as we have seen) was as much a product of welfare-switching as capital-switching. This exposed ethical as well as financial failures, both of which thwarted households' conscientious attempts to deploy domestic assets to fill gaps in the social contract.
This ethical crisis is important but under-explored. Sassen (2012) has intervened by showing how brutalisation can be cloaked by the widening gap between citizens and states. The distancing of households from financial institutions had a similarly dehumanising effect. A barrier of automated valuation models, credit scoring and affordability tests detached lenders from borrowers to the extent that human À and humane À qualities in housing transactions were suppressed. The chain of distancing and disengagement constructed to conjure something (financial deepening) out of nothing (households' untested abilities to service loans anchored on assets of uncertain price) required, and ensured, that little interest would be taken in the life of the debt, much less the welfare of mortgagors, beyond the point of sale (Immergluck, 2009 ). All this helped dissolve the once-special relationship between borrowers and lenders that made home purchase unique (Forrest & Hirayama, 2014) .
These shifts may have been effected by individuals working in loosely regulated settings with poor codes of practice. However, they depended essentially on an ethical compromise built into what I have described elsewhere as the institutionalisation of carelessness (Smith, 2012) ; the embedding of particular values (indifference, iniquity, selfishness) within formalised practices and procedures that operate irrespective of what people think or feel. This is how ostensibly civilised societies, having packaged owner occupation as an ethical as well as economic achievement, could allow something so precarious to be created out of nothing except the idea of what housing assets might be or the domestic economy could bear.
As the world moves towards recovery, it is doubtful whether À at the heart of the matter À very much has changed. Worse still, there is little engagement with the possibility that it could. Langley (2010) points out that a pre-occupation with restoring business (liquidity) as usual has suppressed 'the ethical questioning which is essential for the emergence of a genuinely democratic and inclusionary finance' (p. 84). Harvey (2010 Harvey ( , 2012 argues that when critique is exhausted, the imperative is to act, but he acknowledges that it is by no means clear what form this intervention might take. I regard this as a case for more developed normative thinking. Social science has been reluctant to grasp this nettle, arguably leaving the policy community to wallow in its tireless search for a definitive evidence base. However, the answer to ethical questions is no more rooted in a twenty-first-century store of 'big data' than it was in the meticulous catalogue of facts recorded by the reformists of the early twentieth century. Determining what the future could and should look like is a theoretical and political challenge, and part of it has to do with thinking beyond the tenure-divided status quo that leveraged owner occupation represents.
Resolution: towards a thousand tiny tenures?
By way of four thought experiments, I have so far argued that mortgaged owner occupation is held together by a spatial financial paradox that enables an inherently risky, and ethically contradictory, position to feel uncannily secure and unquestionably normal. So much so that it remains the centrepiece of the world's major housing systems. As households strain to hold this awkward assemblage together, I consider whether À before it breaks irretrievably apart À the paradox might actively be resolved. This too is an attempt to free up the imagination, having regard to both the practicalities and the ethics of the future.
Practicalities: the advent of equity finance
To resolve the first spatial paradox (in which housing services must deliver investment returns), it would be necessary to decouple decisions about housing consumption from wealth-management behaviours, enabling home occupation to meet housing needs rather than maximise investment returns. One solution is to grow the rental market, which is, of course, the de facto position À especially for younger households À in the post-crisis period. However, this leaves the character of owner occupation, as well as the essentials of the tenure divide, untouched. Another option is to expand the myriad experiments in shared ownership À an intermediate tenure in which title deeds are split between, or held collectively by, the individuals and institutions who own and/or occupy a property (Monk & Whitehead, 2010; Whitehead & Yates, 2010) . However, these initiatives tend to cluster at the margins of the market, where they represent a staging point to 'whole' home ownership (Wallace, 2008) .
A more radical future might demand a new style of home occupation, in which households can choose, on a sliding and adjustable scale, what proportion of any investment returns on their property they wish to buy into. To pursue this radical solution, the first financial paradox (in which risk-averse owner occupiers hold all their financial eggs in a single residential property) must also be resolved. This implies steps to make housing investments more like other wealth holdings: divisible, incremental and fungible. An innovation of this kind would enable owners, tenants and others, not only to invest in a single dwelling, but also to spread their wealth across a basket of properties and into other assets. And that, incidentally, would give governments the option to treat housing investment returns like any other, and develop a more progressive approach to housing taxation (Lawton & Reed, 2013) .
This has a bearing on the second spatial paradox À concerned with the secured insecurities of mortgage debt À which exists at all by virtue of a peculiarity in the character of housing finance. Apart from a small owner-supplied deposit, home purchase has, since the invention of the mortgage, been entirely debt funded. This is in marked contrast to, say, small businesses, which would normally balance bank loans with cash injections from a growing côterie of co-investors. If this were more common in housing markets À if home occupiers were able to reduce their dependence on debt funding for housing, and if those who wish, or are forced, to spend from housing wealth could do so by dipping into liquid housing assets rather extending their loans À the scope for unsustainable leverage to undermine the security associated with home occupation could substantially be reduced.
This implies that, in principle, three of the four paradoxical positions set out earlier could be resolved by complementing conventional mortgage debt with innovations in equity finance, where, as well as sharing interest rate risks, housing investment risks could be spread among owner occupiers, and other individuals and institutions. The prospects for this have recently been considered in the UK (Smith, Whitehead, & Williams, 2013) , Australia (Pinnegar, Easthope, Randolph, Williams, & Yates, 2009) , and Switzerland (Syz, Vanini, & Salvi, 2008) , as well as in the USA (Caplin, Carr, Pollock, & Tong, 2007; Mian & Sufi, 2014; Temkin, Theodus, & Price, 2013) , where home purchase products that continually adjust to price as well as interest rates, and which could potentially include other risk-sharing arrangements, have already been designed (Ambrose & Buttimer, 2012; Shiller, Wojakowski, Ebrahim, & Shackleton, 2011) . Other products, such as home price insurance, house price-linked savings accounts, and equity-funded arrears management could follow (Smith, 2010) , and if the idea were rolled out more widely, it might add to macro-economic stability (Miles, 2012) .
What interests me most, however, is that, at its most radical, equity finance could inspire a new style of home occupation. Because it anticipates new partnerships between institutions and individuals, it could underpin a new division of responsibility for the quality, condition and future of the housing stock as well as a new approach to housing market risks and rewards. More engaging still, it could be used to dissolve the stark binary between owners and renters that tenure-divided societies endure, creating myriad options for home occupiers to part-buy, partshare, part-rent and part-steward in housing systems comprising a 'thousand tiny tenures'. This, of course, is a reference to Elizabeth Grosz's (1993) complex attempt to dissemble the gender dualism. I use it here to invite discussion about a future for housing that is tenure neutral and profoundly diverse, harnessing the many varieties of residential capitalism to break the spell of owner occupation, without reinventing the wheel of renting.
Ethics: the quest for care-full markets To achieve a vision of this kind implies a substantial flow of funds. There are several possible sources, but it is hard to escape the conclusion that to thrive across whole housing systems, equity finance presumes a new round of financial engineering to increase the divisibility, liquidity and tradability of housing assets. This, however, sounds like another attempt to create something out of nothing À an unlikely way to resolve the final financial paradox set out above. Certainly, it would be na€ ıve to think that equity finance À albeit a means of keeping funding for housing closer to home, rooted securely in the known asset value of properties À could not drive another round of asset stripping at the expense of the 'ordinary' housing economy. It will, therefore, take more than the assertion that financial innovation can be democratising (Shiller, 2012 ) À more even than evidence that equity finance can benefit lower as well as higher income households (Iacoviello & Ortalo-Magn e, 2003; Quigley, 2006) À to justify the risks it implies. Because the round of financial deepening into which mortgage debt was drawn in the early twenty-first century was an ethical as well as an economic failure, what is required next has to do not with money but with morality.
In theory, of course, financial instruments anchored on housing assets could differ markedly from their credit-based counterparts: they could be less complex, more transparent, designed with the well-being of consumers in mind, and better regulated with an eye to the quality, condition and future of the housing stock. There might also be limits placed on who invests what, when and where, and on how some portion of any profit is used. However, this still begs the question of what will protect the interests of households and maintain the integrity of the 'ordinary economy' if housing assets, like mortgage debts before them, are drawn into global financial flows?
To open this debate, the first important step is to recognise not only that efficient markets are a myth (a point well-made by the recent financial crisis), but also that the amoral economy is a fiction (McCloskey, 1983 (McCloskey, , 2002 . If nothing else, the credit debacle of the early twenty-first century confirmed that markets are shot through with values, raising the possibility that if carelessness can be institutionalised, then so, in principle, could compassion. Second, drawing from a different critical tradition, it might be argued that this value-laden economic world is not given but made. Economics is performative (Mackenzie, 2006 ) À a product of political will, enacted through human endeavour. This raises a possibility that I have aired before (Smith, 2005 (Smith, , 2013 , that instead of arguing against markets, and attempting to create alternatives 'outside' them (the project that inspired the welfare state), or indeed trying to rescue public services by injecting 'market principles' into them, it may be worth launching a bid for the housing economy (the major part of most housing systems), or at least for what it could become.
The challenge, then, is to imagine what virtuous housing systems in market societies might look like. Is it possible to measure how well markets work in units of how much, or literally how far (over what distance) they care? Can those elements of markets that are civilising, that valorise co-operation over competition, ever be restored? What is required to keep economics and finance in touch with the ethics of the ordinary world? What kind of regulation could ensure that innovation is deployed in the interests of the good society? How should institutions be shaped to displace brutalisation with beneficence as the link between households and the assets they share? There are no easy answers. However, if experiments in equity finance point to futures beyond 'business as usual', reformatting the ethics of housing markets is an urgent first step.
